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From Stimulus to Science crystallises one of America‟s most celebrated philosophers‟ 
thinking of a lifetime on naturalised epistemology. This slim volume grew out of 
Quine‟s Ferrarer Mora Lectures of 1990 at the Universitat de Girona in Catalonia. Its 
overarching theme can fairly be described as rational reconstruction of the passage to 
mature, predictive scientific theory from “...the mere impacts of rays and particles on 
our surfaces and a few odds and ends such as the strain of walking uphill” (p. 16).  
 
The first chapter, “Days of Yore”, is an idiosyncratic and occasionally charming 
survey of philosophy from Thales to Carnap. The tale begins with the problem of 
error: 
 
We and other animals notice what goes on around us. This helps us by suggesting 
what we might expect and even how to prevent it, and thus fosters survival. But the 
expedient works only imperfectly...(p. 1). 
 
Quine suggests that Plato‟s “ideas” were an early attempt to counter the scepticism 
that was already plaguing the ancient Greeks. He mentions Aristotle‟s syllogistic 
achievements, but suggests that in this period “[k]nowledge itself outpaced 
knowledge about knowledge (p. 2)”. He skips lightly over the medieval period to 
discuss the early modern scientists and philosophers. He claims that Hobbes‟ view of 
knowledge was “strikingly modern”, but that Descartes had a “theological 
epistemology”. Locke meets with more approval, though his empiricist account of the 
association of ideas is “the barest beginning”. Berkeley‟s disavowal of matter was, 
Quine writes, “a matter of words”. Hume took British empiricism to the conclusion 
that “there simply is no evidence for the continued existence of an object between one 
occasion and another of our perceiving it.”(p. 5). Such a heavy reliance on privately 
received sense-impressions in epistemology leaves one very little with which to build 
a theory of the world in all its structural complexity. 
 
The reader then encounters Jeremy Bentham, and his innovation, contextual 
definition, whereby terms are defined purely by explaining all sentences in which we 
wish to use them, and objects whose ontological status is dubious may be treated as 
“innocent fictions”. This leads on to a discussion of Principia Mathematica, its 
ambitious project of deriving classical mathematics from logic, thereby clarifying 
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mathematics‟ “whole intricate structure”,  and the death-knell delivered to this hope 
by Goedel in 1931.  This quest for translation as an aid to understanding is claimed to 
apply to empiricist epistemologists generally. Quine claims that Russell and also 
(notably) Rudolf Carnap sought “the explicit construction of the external world, or a 
reasonable facsimile, from sense impressions...”(p. 10). 
 
In chapter two (“Naturalism”) Quine turns to issues on which he and Carnap part 
ways, such as Carnap‟s methodological phenomenalism.  Carnap, of course, wished 
to claim that this was without “metaphysical” implications. However to Quine it is an 
embrace of Cartesian dualism, and he suggests that a better alternative is monism of 
the physicalist variety. How might this be expressed? One might just do physics. Or if 
one wants to flex philosophical muscles, one might be a naturalist. Quine defines 
naturalism as, “rational reconstruction of the individual‟s and/or the race‟s actual 
acquisition of a responsible theory of the external world”.  
 
Famously, Quine claims that this exercise is itself “part and parcel of empirical 
science”. There seems to be some tension between such pragmatic holism and the 
project of rational reconstruction, on at least two counts (though the two are 
connected). The first is a tension between pragmatic holism and the critical distance 
implied by the very term “reconstruction”, and Quine‟s enthusiasm for Principia 
Mathematica-style mapping of a theory‟s entire structure in order to make it clear. 
While one is afloat on Von Neurath‟s raft, one can only add or remove individual 
planks -- surely to “reconstruct” one must get it on dry land?  
 
The second source of tension is between the pragmatic naturalist desire to engage in 
pure description of the progress from stimulus to science in the human being qua 
physical organism, and the normative function Quine sees rational reconstruction 
playing, which can already be seen in the appellation “rational” in “rational 
reconstruction”. These issues return at certain key points in the book. 
 
Quine then begins setting out the details of his rational reconstruction. The path 
begins with what he calls the global stimulus, (a subject‟s total sensory experience of 
a moment, which in a disarmingly frank show of behaviourism he also refers to as “an 
ordered set of receptors”). He then moves throughobservation sentences, which are 
the human counterparts of bird calls and apes‟ cries, pointing out intersubjectively 
observable situations which are directly present to speaker and receiver, to 
observational predication (for example, “That dog is black”), and observation 
categoricals (for example, “When it snows, it‟s cold”). With the latter, one has 
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reached one‟s “first, faltering scientific laws”, and opened a rudimentary theory of the 
world to empirical testing. 
 
Chapter 3 (“Reification”) deals with the next great leap forward for a budding 
epistemology. This chapter may be seen as a rational reconstruction of the emergence 
of existential quantification. Quine claims that reification amounts to “the 
transcending of the specious present”(p. 36). By this he means that one is committed 
to the existence qua object of, for example,  a raven, when one is willing to claim that 
it is the same raven one saw yesterday. Quine imagines the human race “discovering” 
reification in a quantum leap whereby caveman Og presents to his colleague Ug the 
possibility that the cave-bear he is about to pursue into the cave is the bear last year 
which, pursued into a cave, killed their friend Ig.  
 
Of course there are other reifications in the human world-view besides bear-sized 
concrete objects. Quine discusses abstract objects, notably properties, where he stands 
firm, (“There is no entity without identity, and the identity of properties is ill-
defined.” p. 40). Classes, however, are acceptable to a physicalist ontology which, 
“consists of just the physical objects, plus all classes of them, plus all classes of any 
of the foregoing...and so on up” (p. 40). Numbers enter our ontology by this route. 
Numbers must enter somehow if one is to be a good physicalist, for though even “soft 
science” requires classes, “hard science is waist deep in classical mathematics”. 
 
In Chapter 4, “Checkpoints and Empirical Content”, the question arises, what makes 
a sentence an observation sentence? Quine‟s so-called observational categoricals are 
the checkpoints of science, where theory meets world through experimental testing. 
The relative frequency of such checkpoints is what distinguishes the “hard”  from the 
“softer” sciences (such as economics and history). The observation categoricals 
implied by a set of sentences may be said to be its empirical content.. 
 
At this point the normative side to the naturalist‟s rational reconstruction of 
epistemology emerges. Quine suggests that actually sitting down and evaluating the 
empirical checkpoints of “some substantial fragment of science, say Newtonian 
mechanics” could well “contribute to the advancement of natural science by 
uncovering unexpected logical interconnections and suggesting a fruitful new 
hypothesis for testing.” (p. 47) The art of framing hypotheses is an area of 
epistemology in which the normative is ineliminable, and the norms include 
conservatism and simplicity. Normative epistemology also recognises and corrects for 
errors in our theorising about the world which are unfortunate side-effects of natural 
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selection, thus doing for human science what surgical correction of hernias does for 
the human body. 
 
Having pointed out that a theory stands or falls by the observational categoricals it 
implies, Quine asks in Chapter 5 (“Logic and Mathematics”) what defines 
implication? He answers, “elementary predicate logic is enough”. To prove that a set 
of premises implies a conclusion, one may merely prove that they are inconsistent 
with its negation. If one restricts logic thus austerely to elementary predicate logic 
one excludes set theory. Quine is happy with this, preferring to see set theory as 
“another, higher branch of mathematics”. 
 
What distinguishes mathematics from natural science? First of all it lacks any 
empirical content. That characteristic, however, is by no means definitive of 
mathematics. Neither is the essence of mathematics captured by noting that it is what 
Tarski termed a formalised language . Quine concedes that he “has no demarcation to 
propose”, but that “Mathematicity is perhaps a matter of degree”. But what about 
statements such as the continuum hypothesis, which are seemingly entirely 
unconnected to any observation categorical? Are they true or false? Quine has some 
sober words for the “starry eyed set theorist”. We may concede that every statement 
in our language is true or false, while recognising that this makes no difference either 
to our theories or to the observable world. “It is like Kant‟s thing in itself, but seen as 
a matter of human usage rather than cosmic mystery” (p. 57). 
 
In Chapter 6. (“Denotation and Truth”), Quine discusses “the ontology of 
denotation”, and the set-theoretic paradox with which Russell devastated Frege in 
1902. For a consistent account of denotation, he argues,  one must look to a Tarskian 
formalised language. What of truth? Quine notes that this notion is something of a 
placeholder for the sublime and noble in the pursuit of inquiry. This may be seen in 
the determined way in which, when one of our scientific conclusions is falsified (or 
“dislodged by further research”), we say that it was actually never true: 
 
Such is the idiom of realism, and it is integral to the semantics of the predicate „true‟. 
It fittingly vivifies scientific method, the method of interrogating nature by conjecture 
and experiment and abiding by the consequences. (p. 67) 
 
By Chapter 7. (“Semantic Agreement”), the pieces of Quine‟s rational reconstruction 
are almost all in place. Sameness of reference is now defined for bodies (in terms of 
“intersubjective agreement” established either directly, through ostension, or 
indirectly via scientific inference), but not for abstract objects. (“Who is to say 
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whether what you refer to as the number nine is the same thing as what I refer to by 
that phrase”? p. 69). Quine waxes pragmatic at this point. He claims that the question 
makes no sense beyond “what is reflected in successful dialogue. If two scientists 
both propose that neutrinos exist, but differ over whether they have rest mass or not, 
then whether the scientists are proposing different particles or just differing over the 
properties possessed by the neutrino is an empty question. 
 
At last we are equipped to turn to the vexed question of how define sameness of 
meaning. Quine claims that two sentences‟ having the same meaning, “...is reflected 
in sameness of truth value, occasion by occasion.” (p. 76). However the sameness 
actually consists in a disposition, possessed by a speaker, to assent to the two 
sentences occasion by occasion, and this disposition is a “present passive physical 
state of the subject‟s nervous system”. Quine sees his distrust of meanings as the final 
nail in the coffin of ideas, considered as an Early Modern unconscionable ontological 
excess. “Meaning is the idea wedded to the word, and as such it is up again for 
exorcising.” (p. 81). 
 
In Chapter 8, “Things of the Mind”, Quine notes that since the astute philosopher has 
rejected Cartesian dualism for monism, each “state of mind” corresponds to a distinct 
“state of the body”. Now all that is required is a translation manual. Physiology looks 
like a promising start, having already provided much relevant information on 
mentalistic predicates such as “pain”. In fact, the physicalist is dedicated to the belief 
that all sensations and emotions have “a distinctive mechanism or set of alternative 
mechanisms”. Connectionism is mentioned as a promising research project. (p. 88) 
 
Modal logic receives an eleventh hour mention three paragraphs from the end of this 
last chapter, as an  “intensional slough” that may be cleared up by noting that, “[t]he 
modal adverb „necessarily‟, governing a subordinate sentence, gives way to the 
predicate „necessary‟, governing a quotation of that sentence” (p. 99). Quine‟s 
cavalier treatment of necessity and possibility contrasts in an interesting manner with 
much of the analytic philosophy tradition that he was so enormously influential in 
forming. (Though he is careful to note that such studied insouciance does not carry 
over into probability, a vital notion for a naturalised epistemology). Throughout his 
career, it is the holy grail of extensionalism which has led Quine to wander in desert 
landscapes, eschewing teeming, disorderly “worlds” such as those over which modal 
logic quantifies. 
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In only one hundred pages, this book provides an summary of Quine‟s philosophical 
contributions and his distinctive world-view, over a career spanning more than six 
decades. The key issue it raises for the philosopher of science and indeed for the 
scientist is the issue of rational reconstruction which is the book‟s theme. What does 
such a project have to offer science? Does the tension between descriptive and 
normative approaches to epistemology evident here reflect an inability to choose 
between a new vision of philosophy as part of science and the old high Kantian 
critical distance? Or alternatively does it reflect Quine‟s location as a bridge between 
monistic open-ended pragmatism (the previously dominant paradigm in American 
philosophy which he was so influential in replacing), and the newly burgeoning 
logical positivism with its complex strictures on which questions may be regarded as 
meaningful? 
 
Such questions are crucial for those situated now, late in the analytic philosophy 
tradition, who wish to know what was happening at its birth. They will also play a 
key role in years to come in evaluating the true place in the philosophical tradition of 
this most logical, erudite and austerely inclined of philosophers.  
